Risks - Flightcrew compartment door modifications / Security Overflights

RISKS - Flightcrew compartment door modifications / Security Overflights

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 9/11 all of our daily routines and processes and procedures have come into question. Following the realization that 4 planes had been commandeered and turned into flying bombs, an intensive effort began to re-examine everything through the prism of safety and security. Some changes have already been made, others are yet to come. One thing that is not immediately apparent is that nothing is simple, nothing is totally cut and dried, and that almost all security mechanisms require trade-offs. Consider for example the proposition that the airliners' flight crew compartments be secured by locked and impervious doors. This apparent "no-brainer" was immediately floated and everyone began to ask why this hadn't always been standard in U.S. airlines. The airlines immediately began fortifying cockpit doors and in short order every door in their fleets had been modified. Problem solved. Simple answer to a complex problem?? ......well, maybe not that simple....

It turns out that flight crew compartment doors are designed to meet other important flight safety standards. First, in the event of a sudden decompression in the airplane all compartments are designed so that no pressure differential is created that might cause further damage to the airplane. Flight crew compartment doors are designed to provide pressure compensation, either by venting or by automatically swinging open. Second, standards also require that flight crews have an alternative exit path from the flight crew compartment in the case of an emergency should cockpit window exits not be usable. Flight crew compartment doors are designed to provide this escape path. Thus, locked and fortified compartment doors represent a significant variance from existing safety standards. Immediately following the attacks, the Secretary of Transportation formed a Rapid Response Team for Aircraft Security, composed of representatives from aircraft designers, airline operators, airline pilots, and flight attendants. This panel determined that the risk of unauthorized flight crew compartment entry was greater than the safety risk associated with locked and fortified doors. The FAA concurred with their conclusions and allowed a temporary period during which non-compliance with airline design requirements would be allowed. The FAA waived the appropriate airworthiness regulations, as well as the procedural requirements applicable to the making of major alterations. The airlines upgraded their doors in record time. However, in 18 months all modified airplanes will have to be brought back into compliance with all design requirements, so manufacturers and airlines will have to figure out how to accommodate the apparently divergent requirements of air safety and security....

This example clearly illustrates that security measures may also entail risks, and that these risks - however small - need to be weighed against the risk of not implementing the measures. Another current example would be the utilization of military jets to prevent further 'flying bombs' Around the nation fighters are being kept on standby, ready to take off at a moment's notice to intercept and/or destroy any potential repeats of 9/11. Other fighters are also constantly patrolling above certain metropolitan areas.. With fighters in the air with much greater frequency (and with aerial refueling, etc.) the risk of accidents will also increase. Here the risk of equipment malfunction over a metropolitan area needs to be weighed against the risk of not being able to intercept a target. Apparently the competing risks have been weighed and at this point in time a decision has been made that the risk of a malfunction is the lesser of the two risks. However, this decision will need to be periodically re-evaluated and if the balance changes then aerial patrols will need to be terminated.